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A HISTORICAL VIEW OF LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP ROLL-UPS:

CAUSES, ABUSES, AND PROTECTIVE STRATEGIES
GORDON

B.

SHNEIDER*

INTRODUCTION

The limited partnership has a long history as an investment vehicle and
business organizational form.' In the 1970s and 1980s, Congress enacted statutory changes intended to alter the limited partnership's conceptualization as
an investment vehicle and business organization to reflect more accurately
both the tax incentives of the investor and the financing requirements of the
limited partnerships.' Section I of this Article describes the limited
partnership's history. Section II discusses the impact of the various partnership
statutes on the reorganization of limited partnerships.
Economic conditions in the latter half of the 1980s had a major impact on

* Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law, J.D. DePaul University,
LL.M. University of Chicago. The author wishes to express his thanks to Professor Sandy
Braber-Grove for her patient and careful research assistance. Her help was invaluable, but
icsponsibility for the use to which it was put is mine.
1. ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 2 (1968).
Bromberg indicates that partnerships, as profit seeking arrangements, date back to Babylonia
and continue through classical Greece and Rome. Limited partnerships as a specialized form
were recognized in the courts of England, using equity principles, and were known as the
Commenda or Societe en Commandite in continental Europe. Later cases were decided by
common law courts using mercantile customs supplemented by the civil law. The extensive
use of partnerships in the nineteenth century resulted in codification to reduce confusion and
uncertainty. In the United States the Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act were completed in 1914 and 1916 respectively. id. § 2, at 10-13.
2. See 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 11.02(c)-(d) (1994). In 1976, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("the Conference") adopted a revision to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1916 ("ULPA") intending to modernize the ULPA after sixty years of experience
and major economic change in the United States. REV. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6
U.L.A. 347-48 (1976) (prefatory note). In 1985, the Conference adopted amendments to the
1976 Act. See REV. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AT, 6 U.L.A. (1985).
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1916 and the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1976 and 1985 are discussed throughout this article. The 1916 Act will be
cited as the "U.L.P.A. (1916)." The 1976 revision will be cited as the "R.U.L.P.A. (1976)."
The 1985 amendments will be cited as the "R.U.L.P.A. (1985)."
The Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 and 1993 will be cited as the "U.P.A. (1914)"
and the "U.P.A. (1993)" respectively.
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the asset values of many limited partnerships During the same period, Congress changed the Internal Revenue Code, radically reducing the tax advantages of using the limited partnership form. 4 Section III details the manner in
which these variables provided incentives for the use of limited partnership
roll-up transactions.
Economic and tax changes resulted in a wave of reorganization and attempted reorganization. 5 These reorganizations, often described as "roll-ups,"
take several technically distinguishable forms.6 For purposes of this introductory discussion, the term "roll-up" will generally describe the reorganization of
one or more limited partnerships into a new investment vehicle. Many investors involved in a roll-up suffered large economic losses.7 It is not clear what
portion of those losses may be ascribed to the reorganization transaction' and
what portion resulted from the forced market recognition of the diminished
value in the underlying assets.9
The long history of limited partnerships as investment vehicles and organizational forms provides a testament to their societal value."0 Maintaining
this value mandates that investors in limited partnerships requiring reorganization be afforded adequate protection from unscrupulously and incompetently
planned roll-ups." This protection must not, however, jeopardize this valuable form of business organization. Section IV describes the various attempts,
through legislation and regulation, to accomplish such "efficient" protection.

3. See infra part IIl.A.
4. See infra part III.B.
5. See infra part III.C.
6. The reorganization "roll-up" transaction extends the life of a limited partnership,
combines two or more limited partnerships into a limited partnership with a longer term, or
reorganizes one or more limited partnerships into a new entity. See infra part 11.
7. Anthony Carideo, More Roll-ups Likely to Leave Investors Feeling Rolled Over,
STAR TRIB., Feb. 17, 1991, at DI; Kirstin Downey, Partnership "Roll-ups" Leave Some
Investors Down, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1991, at FI; Laura Evenson, Probers Turn Attention
to Real-estate Roll-ups Technique Said to Cost Investors $1.6 Billion, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 3,
1990, at Cl; David Satterfield, Roll-ups are Financial Deals that Often End in More Losses,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 21, 1991, at KI; Richard D. Wollack Partnership Roll-ups Hurt Small
Investors, Economy, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 24, 1992, at D5.
8. As a result of the multiple roll-up transactions available and the fees and costs inherent in such transactions it is difficult to isolate the economic impact of the transaction itself. See infra part If.
9. In a setting of diminished value in the underlying assets and costs of the transaction itself, it is difficult to specifically quantify the proportional source of the investor's loss.
See infra part III.A.
10. See supra note 1.
I. See Deborah A. Demott, Rollups of Limited Partnerships: Questions of Regulation
and Fairness, 70 WASH. U.L.Q. 617 (1992); Larry E. Ribstein, Unlimited Contracting in the
Delaware Limited Partnership and Its Implications for Corporate Law, 16 1. CORP. L. 299
(1991); Craig B. Smith, Limited Partnerships - Expanded Opportunities Under Delaware's
1988 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 43 (1990); Kenneth R.
Hillier, Note, Rolling Down the Curtain on "Roll-ups": the Case for Federal Legislation to
Protect Limited Partners, 90 MICH. L. REV. 155 (1991); John A. Sellers, Comment, Publicly
Traded Limited Partnerships: are the Limited Partners Being Rolled Over in Roll-ups?, 69
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 627 (1992).
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This Article features a survey of the Limited Partnership Roll-up Reform Act
of 1993 and assesses the impact of remedial efforts in the context of a balanced response which provides investor protection without destroying the
efficacy of an evolving useful reorganizational tool.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND ITS STATUTORY
REGULATION

A historical view of the limited partnership provides insight into its value
as an investment vehicle and an organizational tool. The common law developed the general partnership as the basic model for organization of a business
enterprise. 2 In 1902, the Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws ("the Conference") set out to codify these developments. By 1914 the
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) was recommended to the states. 3 The virtues
of the general partnership included its ease of formation, 14 informality of operation, 5 and potential for internal flexibility resulting from the partnership
agreement. 6 However, unlimited personal liability" and the fragility of the
organization s created unacceptable risks for some investors.
The historical alternative to the general partnership was the chartered
corporation, of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, succeeded by the statutory corporation of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 9 This organizational model provided limited liability for passive investors, continuity of
life, and formal operations. ' Prior to broad acceptance of the close corporation, however, the public corporation model proved cumbersome and ill-suited
to a business organization lacking the characteristics of a large public corporation.2'

12.

See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS § 1.04 (2d. ed. 1990).

13. See I BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 1.02(b).
14. See U.P.A. § 6 (1914) (defining a partnership as "an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit"); U.P.A. § 7 (1914) (providing rules
for determining the existence of a partnership).
15. See U.P.A. § 18(e) (1914) (providing that "[alll partners have equal rights in the
management and conduct of the partnership business").
16. See U.P.A. § 18 (1914) (providing that "[tlhe rights and duties of the partners in
relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between themn")
(emphasis added).
17. U.P.A. § 15 (1914) provides: "[all partners are liable (a) Jointly and severally for
everything chargeable to the partnership under sections 13 [partner's wrongful acts] and 14
lpartner's breaches of trust]. (b) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership."
18. See U.P.A. § 29 (1914): "[tlhe dissolution of a partnership is the change in the
relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as
distinguished from the winding up of the business."
19. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, § 1.04.
20. See id. § 1.02[C]13]; REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.22 (1984) (providing
for limited liability of shareholders); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1984)

(providing the affairs of the corporation be managed by a board of directors).
21. A famous, oft-quoted opinion recognizing the need for broad recognition of close
corporation concepts is Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill.
1964).
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The limited partnership offered a model for investors dissatisfied with the
polar models.2" The limited partnership was used most often by passive investors desiring protection from creditors, and by non-public ventures of a
limited duration in need of protection from unexpected dissolutions. 3 Nineteenth-century state experiments with statutory models resulted in the
Conference's recommendation of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1916
(ULPA).24 Courts generally measured compliance with this unique statute in a
strict manner.2 5
The development of potential pitfalls under the ULPA resulted in a less
than uniform application among the adopting states. 6 Difficulties centered
around a series of provisions. First, the formality of formation made entry or
exit before dissolution difficult. In order to form a limited partnership each
member had to sign and swear to a certificate of limited partnership which
was filed with the state.27 Any addition or substitution of limited partners
required all members of the partnership to sign and swear to an amendment to
the certificate.28 In addition, a limited partner could only assign his or her
interest to a substituted limited partner (requiring unanimous consent of the
other partners) or to an assignee with limited rights.29 Second, the conditioning of limited liability on a limited partner's non-participation in control of the
business" resulted in ambiguous interpretations and potential oppression of
limited partners." This second factor also diminished the importance of the
limited partnership agreement, because attempts to provide voting protection
for limited partners risked exposing such limited partners to unlimited liability.32 Finally, the absence of provisions governing potential litigation to correct abuses created intolerable conflicts.33
Three models-general partnership, limited partnership, and the corporation-represented options for business organization and investment in the early
twentieth century. Choices were relatively straightforward. Balancing advantages and disadvantages of each form resulted in a choice for investors and
entrepreneurs as to which form best suited their perceived needs. From the
standpoint of the entrepreneur, an appropriate business organizational form
provided a managerial model consistent with the business enterprise and at-

22. See 3 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 11.01(b)-(c) (comparing limited partnerships with general partnerships and corporations).
23. See id. § 12.01 (discussing the nature, definition, and scope of limited partnerships).
24. See U.L.P.A. (1916).
25. BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26(a), at 144 & n.25.
26. See id. § 2, at 13-14.
27. U.L.P.A. § 2 (1916).
28. U.L.P.A. § 8 (1916) (requiring amendment to certificate for addition of limited partners); U.L.P.A. § 25(l)(b) (1916) (requiring amendment to certificate adding or substituting
limited partners be signed and sworn to by all members, the added or substituted limited
partner, and the assigning limited partner in the case of substitution).
29. U.L.P.A. § 19 (1916).
30. U.L.P.A. § 7 (1916).
31. See BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26(c).
32. See 4 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 15.15(f).
33. See generally U.L.P.A. (1916).
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tractive to potential investors in that particular economic area. For a small
managerial group desiring substantial control over the enterprise, the general
partnership was of some utility, but unlimited liability made it a flawed model.
On the other hand, unless the business enterprise was large and carried a high
likelihood of success, the corporate model could prove too expensive and
speculative to attract capital.
Thus, because the general partnership proved unattractive to potential
investors and the corporate form proved to be economically risky, the limited
partnership was attractive to investors and management. For the investor desiring limited liability and no active participation in management, the limited
partnership offered possibilities unavailable in a statutory corporation.' The
passive investor could assure limitation of the nature of the economic project," limitation on the duration of the project,36 and a dissolution and liquidation which would conform to a predetermined statutory model.37
Beginning in the mid-1930's, the fact that typical state statutes' restrictions on public corporations, while appropriate for public corporations, were
less well suited to corporations which were more private in nature began to be
recognized. Thus arose the "close" corporation.39 This term referred to a
business organization possessing characteristics which enabled a court to interpret legislative models less restrictively.4" Eventually, legislatures recognized
this need and developed statutory close corporations.4' Absent other external
developments, the popularity of, and need for, the limited partnership might
have been destroyed by the rise of the close corporation.
The increases in individual marginal income tax rates and corporate tax
rates were the major external developments reinforcing the continuing need for
limited partnerships. These two significant external events impacted heavily on

34. See 3 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 11.01(c) (comparing corporations
and limited partnerships); RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, § 2.04[A] (discussing reasons for selecting limited partnerships).
35. See U.L.P.A. § 2(l)(a)(lI) (1916) (requiring the character of the partnership business
be included in the certificate of limited partnership); U.L.P.A. § 24(2)(f) (1916) (requiring
amendment to certificate for "change in the character of the business of the partnership");
U.L.P.A. § 25(l)(b) (1916) (requiring amendment to certificate to be signed and sworn to by
all members of the partnership).
36. See U.L.P.A. § 2(l)(a)(V) (1916) (requiring the term for which the partnership is to
exist be included in the certificate of limited partnership); U.L.P.A. § 24(2)(h) (1916) (requiring amendment to certificate for change in the time for dissolution of the partnership);
U.L.P.A. § 25(l)(b) (1916) (requiring amendment to certificate to be signed and swom to by
all members of the partnership).
37. See U.L.P.A. § 23 (1916).
38.

See CHARLES

R. O'KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,

CORPORATIONS AND

OTHER ASsOCIATIONS 359-60 (1992) (noting that corporate law norms may be less suitable
for the typical closely held corporation than for publicly held firms).
39. See Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (111. 1964) (discussing close corporations);
Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936) (for an early ambiguous case on close corporations).
40. See Galler, 203 N.E.2d at 584.
41.

See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1984)

integrated statute).

(providing an example of an
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business organizational forms. High individual marginal tax rates created a
need to "shelter" distributions to individual investors. The second development, higher corporate rates (which worsened the "double taxation" phenomenon) reduced investors' after-tax income.42 This created substantial tax
disincentives to the use of the close corporation, especially when distributions
to "passive" investors were needed to make their investments attractive. 3
This second problem could be solved by "passing through" the income of the
business organization to individual investors, avoiding double taxation to individuals. The basic system of taxation for partnerships allowed income to "pass
through."' As a result, this externality to issues of business organization became an'important driving force in the choice of business organizational form.
The entrepreneur found her choice dominated by the external tax impact on
the needed passive investors. The renewed prominence of the limited partnership as a tax sheltering business organizational form in the 1970s and 1980s
resulted in changes to the governing uniform statute.45 These changes took
place in a number of substantive areas, each of which will be discussed separately.
First, there was change in the uniform statute's requirements in the certificate of limited partnership. The ULPA operated on the premise that limited
partnerships existed only by statutory authorization.46 Necessary for compliance with statutory requirements was the partners' sworn execution and recorded filing of a certificate of limited partnership.47 Section 2 of the ULPA
required the inclusion of substantial detail in that document."5 Consequently,

42.

See

WILLIAM H. PAINTER. CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD COR10-11 (2d ed. 1981). The "double taxation" concept is straightforward. The net
taxable income of the corporation is subject to tax at a rate dependent upon the level of income. Any distributions to investors would be made from the after-tax income of the corporation and would then again be subject to taxation at the rate applicable to the distribution
receiving investor. See id. The details of the deduction available and the tax computation are
complex, but the basic concept is straightforward.
43. See id. (noting that the double taxation of close corporations is a disadvantage).
Since 1982 there has been tax relief available for subchapter S corporations but only under
the details of qualification for such an election. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (West 1994). These
limitations are restrictive to the formation and operations of the business organizational model.
44. See I.R.C. § 701 (West 1994) which provides: "[al partnership as such shall not be
subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners
shall be liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities."
45. See R.U.L.P.A. (1976); R.U.L.P.A. (1985).
46. See U.L.P.A. § 1 (1916) defining a limited partnership as: "A limited partnership is
a partnership formed by two or more persons under the provisions of Section 2, having as
members one or more general partners and one or more limited partners." (emphasis added).
Thus, its existence is dependent upon meeting the provisions of U.L.P.A. § 2 (1916).
47. See U.L.P.A. § 2 (1916).
48. U.L.P.A. § 2(l)(a) (1916) required:
(1) Two or more persons desiring to form a limited partnership shall
(a) Sign and swear to a certificate, which shall state
I.The name of the partnership,
11.The character of the business,
111.
The location of the principal place of business,
PORATIONS
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the limited partnership certificate became the dominant governing document
for the operation of the business organization. Rigid detail was further complicated by statutory requirements relating to the amendment of the certificate.49
Such rigid requirements reduced the flexibility of operation and created substantial "hold-out" power for each investor. Both the 1976 Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act and the 1985 amendments substantially reduced the
required inclusions in the formal certificate."0 The 1985 amendments reduced
required inclusions in limited partnership certificates to the partnership name
and address, the name and address of general partners, and the latest date for
dissolution." Such changes meant that the partnership agreement replaced the
limited partnership certificate as the critical governing document.5 2 This
change in the formal requirements removed one of the disincentives to the use
of limited partnerships and provided broad latitude for negotiating the terms of
the relationships of the partners inter se."

IV. The name and place of residence of each member; general and limited partners
being respectively designated,
V. The term for which the partnership is to exist,
VI. The amount of cash and a description of and the agreed value of the other
property contributed by each limited partner,
VII. The additional contributions, if any, agreed to be made by each limited partner
and the times at which or events on the happening of which shall be made,
VIII. The time, if agreed upon, when the contribution of each limited partner is to
be returned,
IX. The share of the profits or the other compensation by way of income which
each limited partner shall receive by reason of his contribution,
X. The right, if given, of a limited partner to substitute an assignee as contributor
in his place, and the terms and conditions of the substitution,
XI. The right, if given, of the partners to admit additional limited partners,
XII. The right, if given, of one or more of the limited partners to priority over
other limited partners, as to contributions or as to compensation by way of income,
and the nature of such priority,
XIII. The right, if given, of the remaining general partner or partners to continue
the business on the death, retirement or insanity of a general partner, and
XIV. The right, if given, of a limited partner to demand and receive property other
than cash in return for his contribution.
Id.
49. See U.L.P.A. § 25 (1916) (requiring a swom writing signed by all members of the
partnership).
50. See R.U.L.P.A. § 201(a) (1985).
51. Id.
52. R.U.L.P.A. § 201 cmt. (1985) provides:
The 1985 Act requires far fewer matters to be set forth in the certificate of limited
partnership than did Section 2 of the 1916 Act and Section 201 of the 1976 Act.
This is recognition of the fact that the partnership agreement, not the certificate of
limited partnership, has become the authoritative and comprehensive document for
most limited partnerships. ...
Id.
53. The flexibility resulting from the use of the partnership agreement as the critical
document is recognized in other sections of the 1985 Act as well. See, e.g., R.U.L.P.A. §
302 (1985) (providing that "the partnership agreement may grant to all or a specified group
of the limited partners, the right to vote"); R.U.L.P.A. § 401 (1985) (providing that "additional general partners may be admitted as provided in writing in the partnership agree-
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Second, there was a change in the limited liability of the limited partner.
Under the ULPA, limited liability was dependent upon the passive nature of
the investor.' Section 7 of the ULPA provides, "[a] limited partner shall not
become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his
rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business."" The ambiguity of this broad statement made protection of the passive
investor hazardous. Consultation with, or decision making by, limited partners
created the risk of participation in the "control of the business."56 Section 303
of the RULPA, while retaining the general preclusion of participation in the
control of the business, changed its scope in two ways.5" First, liability as a
result of participation in control requires reliance on the limited partner's
conduct as a general partner.58 Second, the statute now identifies a list of acts
which by themselves do not constitute participation in the control of the business.59 Significant items on this list are: (1) managerial roles of a corporate
general partner; (2) consulting with, or advising, the general partner; (3) participating in a derivative action on the part of the partnership; (4) requesting or
attending a meeting of partners; (5) proposing and voting on matters related to
dissolution, sale or exchange of partnership assets, incurring partnership indebtedness other than in the ordinary course of business, a change in the nature of the business, membership of general or limited partners, acts to amend
the partnership agreement or certificate of partnership; or (6) participating in
approval of matters designated in the partnership agreement as subject to limited partner approval or disapproval.' Thus, outside of daily management activities, limited partners may become extensively involved in policy planning
and approval, and more effectively protect their investments, without risking
general liability to creditors.
Third, there was a change in the limited partner's ability to insure an early
return of funds invested in the organization. Under the ULPA the formal certificate of limited partnership was required to identify the term of the partner-

ment"); R.U.L.P.A. § 503 (1985) (providing that "profits and losses of a limited partnership
shall be allocated among the partners, and among classes of partners, in the manner provided
in writing in the partnership agreement").
54. U.L.P.A. § I cmt. (1916) (noting that one fundamental principle of the ULPA is
that a limited partner is a partner in all respects, except that to retain limited liability he or
she must comply with the statutory requirements of the certificate and refrain from participation in the conduct of the business).
55. U.L.P.A. § 7 (1916).
56. See Stephen I. Burr, The Potential Liability of Limited Partners as General Partners, 67 MAss. L. REV. 22, 23-27 (1982) (discussing judicial decisions concerning the meaning of "control of the business").
57. See R.U.L.P.A. § 303 (1985).
58. R.U.L.P.A. § 303(a) (1985) provides that "if the limited partner participates in the
control of the business, he [or she] is liable only to the persons who transact business with
the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's conduct, that
the limited partner is a general partner."
59. R.U.L.P.A. § 303(b) (1985).
60. Id.
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ship,6 the time for return of contribution if agreed,6" and the right (if available) and terms of limited partner substitution.63
Significantly, amendment of these restrictions was conditioned upon the
unanimous agreement of all partners,' creating in each partner veto power
over any change in the term of the investment. Furthermore, the restrictions on
alienation rendered uncertain any limited partner's attempt to recoup an investment by transferring the limited partnership interest for consideration. Assigning an interest to a substitute limited partner would require either permission
in the certificate to substitute limited partners,65 or the unanimous amendment
of the certificate.' Finally, although the statute provided for assignment of a
limited partnership interest without substitution67 (avoiding a unanimous vote)
the assignee's limited rights6" made such assignments difficult to negotiate.
The illiquidity resulting from these statutory proscriptions received special
attention by the drafters of the RULPA and its 1985 amendment. The model
for resolution of the problem was incorporated into several parts of the
RULPA. First, the certificate of limited partnership no longer requires either
the names of, nor sworn execution by, limited partners.69 Thus, no statutory
unanimous execution of the certificate is required. In its place, the partnership
agreement becomes the governing document.7"
Under the RULPA, the partnership agreement may now identify in writing
the date or events that permit withdrawal by any limited partner." As a result
of this provision, unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise, the
withdrawing limited partner "is entitled to receive, within a reasonable time
after withdrawal, the fair value of his [or her] interest in the limited partnership as of the date of withdrawal.""2 Additionally, partnership interests are
now assignable in the absence of preclusion by the partnership agreement.
More importantly, the agreement itself can create the power in the assignor to
grant limited partner status in the assignee.74 Thus, the negotiated partnership

61. U.L.P.A. § 2(1)(a)(V) (1916).
62. U.L.P.A. § 2(I)(a)(Vill) (1916).
63. U.L.P.A. § 2(l)(a)(X) (1916).
64. U.L.P.A. § 25(l)(b) (1916).
65. U.L.P.A. § 2(l)(a)(X) (1916).
66. U.L.P.A. § 25 (1)(b) (1916).
67. U.L.P.A. § 19(1) (1916).
68. U.L.P.A. § 19(3) (1916).
69. R.U.L.P.A. § 201 (1985).
70. See R.U.L.P.A. § 201 cmt. (1985) (noting that the partnership agreement has become the authoritative document of limited partnership).
71. R.U.L.P.A. § 603 (1985) (providing a limited partner with the right to withdraw
from the partnership at the happening of events specified in the partnership agreement or
upon six months notice to each general partner if the partnership agreement does not specify
a definite time for dissolution or specific events for withdrawal).
72. R.UL.P.A. § 604 (1976).
73. R.U.L.P.A. § 702 (1976).
74. R.U.L.P.A. § 704 (1985) provides that "[aln assignee of a partnership interest . . .
may become a limited partner if and to the extent that (i)the assignor gives the assignee
that right in accordance with authority described in the partnership agreement, or (ii) all
other partners consent." id.
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agreement could make alienation possible and practical. This third alternative
of distribution to all partners upon early dissolution appeared to require unanimity under the ULPA75 or a judicial dissolution,76 neither of which were
of much aid to liquidity. In an attempt to clarify the right to dissolution, the
RULPA provided for non-judicial dissolution either at the time specified in the
certificate" or upon the happening of events specified in the partnership
agreement." Under the RULPA, judicial dissolution is permissible when "it
is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the
partnership agreement."79 Thus, one could negotiate terms for a dissolution,
perhaps as a liquidity option of last resort.
Fourth, there was a change in the concept of standing. The ULPA did
little to clarify the historically confused concept of standing in the partnership
context. The ULPA provided that "[a] contributor, unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party to proceedings by or gainst a partnership, except
where the object is to enforce a limited partner's right against or liability to
the partnership."8 Thus, except in those narrow circumstances where the substantive theory was based upon a duty owed directly to the limited partner and
the injury was sustained directly by the limited partner, a limited partner did
not have standing in a proceeding by or against a partnership.
With the advent of the flexibility resulting from the predominance of the
partnership agreement, this ambiguity concerning the source of the power to
bring causes of action required clarification. The RULPA drafters chose the
entity concept unambiguously and provided for the addition of derivative
actions in limited partnerships.8 ' As a result, limited partners had the statutory power to act, irrespective of the complications of entity theory, because the
action could be instituted in the form of a class action or derivative suit as the
theory required, while retaining the financial efficiency of a multi-party action.2

75. See U.L.P.A. § 2(I)(a)(V). (VIII) (1916) (requiring the certificate of limited partnership to include the partnership term and the time for contribution); U.L.P.A. § 25(l)(b)
(1916) (requiring unanimous consent to any amendment of the certificate).
76. The limited partner's right to judicial dissolution was narrow and ambiguous.
U.L.P.A. § 10(l)(C) (1916) provides that "[a] limited partner shall have the same rights as a
general partner to . . . [hiave dissolution and winding up by decree of court." However, the
ULPA did not grant specific statutory powers to a general partner to "have a dissolution."
Section 16 of the ULPA allowed the limited partner to demand return of contribution or
dissolution only when he or she could rightfully do so under the certificate of limited partnership. U.L.P.A. § 16 (1916).
77. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(l) (1985).
78. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(2) (1985).
79. R.U.L.P.A. § 802 (1985).
80. U.L.P.A. § 26 (1916).
81. See R.U.L.P.A. § 1001 (1985):
A limited partner may bring an action in the right of a limited partnership to recover a judgment in its favor if general partners with authority to do so have refused to bring the action or if an effort to cause those general partners to bring the
action is not likely to succeed.
Id. For details of the procedure under this section see, R.U.L.P.A. §§ 1002-04 (1985).
82. See R.U.L.P.A. §§ 1001-04 (1985).
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TRANSACTIONAL MODELS FOR REORGANIZING LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS

While the ULPA served a useful purpose, modem business organization
and finance had become too sophisticated for the 1916 statute.8" In order to
retain the efficiency of limited partnerships a more flexible enabling statute
was required. With the development of increased marginal tax rates and the
consequent need for sheltering income, the need for revision became more
pressing. The RULPA and its amendments represented reactions to these developments. The RULPA's flexibility and reliance upon the partnership agreement constituted a reasoned response to this need.
The impact of the RULPA and its amendments on the subsequent and
unanticipated need for reorganization of the limited partnership entity seems
inadvertent but rational within the developed scheme. The RULPA created a
system in which a bargained-for agreement could meet the developing needs
of a changing economy.' The measure of rigidity retained by the 1976 Act
was intended to protect creditors, not parties to the bargain, in their dealings
with the limited partners.85
Typically, passive investors would be reasonably economically successful,
with a desire for cash flow, negligible income, and/or pass-through losses. The
partnership would create (or purchase and manage) assets which would produce those results for a limited period of time and which, at the end of that
period, could be sold to return the investment with tax advantages. 6 Certain
events, however, could frustrate the cash flow objectives and render unsound
the anticipated sale of the assets at the scheduled time of dissolution and subsequent distribution. In such a circumstance, a postponement of liquidation,
through some form of reorganization, appears desirable.87 There are a number
of transactional models for reorganization of limited partnerships for the pur-

83. One of the major developments which radically changed one use of limited partnerships was the potential for their change in size. As opportunities for large scale economic
developments in real estate, oil and gas, and other large projects offered tax sheltering advantages, due to tax pass-throughs of expenses, the potential for large groups of limited
partners presented itself. In one format the passive investors received traditional limited partnership interests usually in private placements, Another format for the large offering was to
place the limited partnership interest in trust and have the trustee offer participation units in
the trust. This format, most commonly referred to as a master limited partnership, could provide registration and trading in these resultant limits. The transactions available in this modem setting were inconsistent with smaller privately held enterprises which were provided for
by the ULPA. Thus, a Revised Act suitable to these potential transactions was needed.
84. See R.U.L.P.A. § 201 cmt. (1985) (noting that the partnership agreement has become the authoritative document of the limited partnership).
85. See, e.g., R.U.L.P.A. § 303 (1985) (liability to third parties); R.U.L.P.A. § 403(b)
(1985) (liabilities of general partners); R.U.L.P.A. § 607 (1985) (limitations on distribution);
R.U.L.P.A. § 804(1) (1985) (priorities in the distribution of assets).
86. This is a paradigm of the persons involved in a limited partnership tax shelter and
their traditional desires.
87. The concept described is predicated upon a judgment that the assets have value, but
due to external conditions they are temporarily undervalued. Liquidation at the scheduled
time would be financially undesirable and there should be reason to believe that the ability
to postpone the liquidation would have economic benefits to the investors.
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pose of postponement of liquidation. In discussing the transactional models for
reorganization, it is helpful to compare the statutory impact of the ULPA and
the RULPA on such reorganizations.
A. Pure Extension by Amendment
The most straightforward approach to reorganization is to extend the term
of the partnership and establish a new date for the asset sale and subsequent
dissolution. Even this simple transaction proved difficult under the old ULPA,
primarily because the basic governing document was the certificate of limited
partnership. 8 The ULPA required the term of the partnership and the time
for return of the limited partner's contribution to be included in the certificate
of limited partnership. 9 A change in the certificate required an amendment
signed and sworn to by all members of the partnership.' This could prove
both cumbersome and exceedingly difficult in many situations. If the dates in
the certificate were ignored and no attempt to amend was made, each limited
partner would be entitled to demand return of the contribution9 or, if the
demand was unsuccessful, dissolution of the partnership.92
The RULPA provides a less formal means of accomplishing the pure
extension by amendment. It requires the certificate of limited partnership state
the last time at which the limited partnership may dissolve.93 However,
amendment may be made for a proper purpose at the discretion of the general
partners.' Additionally, due to the informality under the RULPA, the certificate no longer requires the sworn execution of all the partners.95 Thus, changes in the partnership term are less difficult under the RULPA than under the
ULPA.
In certain situations, however, the specific term of the partnership would
be important to the partnership's marketability. Under the RULPA, which
provides wide latitude as to provisions inter se in the agreement,' the specific term of the partnership could be included in the partnership agreement.
Thus, the term of the partnership and the means by which that term could be
modified could be provided in the negotiated partnership agreement. The only

88. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
89. U.L.P.A. § 2(l)(a)(V), (VIll) (1916).
90. U.L.P.A. § 24(2)(h) (1916) (requiring amendment to certificate for a change in the
time for dissolution or return of a contribution); U.L.P.A. § 25(1)(b) (1916) (requiring
amendment to be signed and sworn to by all members of the partnership).
91. U.L.P.A. § 16(2)(b) (1916).
92. U.L.P.A. § 16(4)(a) (1916); see also U.L.P.A. § 10(l)(c) (1916) (providing the
limited partner with the same fights as a general partner to "[have a dissolution and winding up by decree of court").
93. R.U.L.P.A. § 201(a)(4) (1985).
94. R.U.L.P.A. § 202(d) (1985).
95. See R.U.L.P.A. § 201(a) (1985) (not requiring sworn execution by all members of
the partnership or inclusion of the limited partners names in the certificate); R.U.L.P.A. §
204(a)(1) (1985) (requiring only general partners to sign certificate).
96. See, e.g., R.U.L.P.A. § 302 (1985) (providing wide discretion for the partnership
agreement to grant or restrict voting power of the limited partners).
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major limitation on the power of the partnership agreement to provide for the
term of the partnership would be the provision for judicial dissolution.9
The ULPA made it extremely difficult to extend the life of a limited
partnership absent unanimous consent of all the partners. The RULPA, though
not specifically intended to resolve the extension-of-term problem, did so by
providing the discretion necessary to accomplish an extension.
B. Buyout of Limited Partners
The term of the partnership could also be modified by a buyout of the old
limited partners. A straightforward cash purchase would be a voluntary transaction. A cash price based upon the present value of the partnerships's assets
would not be conducive to such a voluntary sale.9" Rather, the transaction
could be structured as an exchange offer of an interest in a new enterprise,
resulting in a delayed liquidation of the old limited partnership assets." The
unanimity required by the ULPA, however, would render the transaction
impractical."
The alternative to unanimity is some form of "cramdown" that would
force recalcitrant limited partnership holders to accept the transaction or some
"fair" substitute."' 1 There seems to be no such direct relief in any of the uniform partnership acts. The RULPA, however, permits substantial latitude for
governance in the partnership agreement."2 An implication of the power to
include such a transaction in the agreement would require the combination of
concepts from a number of sections in the RULPA."' Section 303 specifical-

97. R.U.L.P.A. § 802 (1985) provides for judicial dissolution "[oln application by or for
a partner . . . whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the partnership agreement." Non-judicial dissolutions are controlled by the partnership agreement. R.U.L.P.A. § 801 (1985).
98. The problem posited which creates the need for an extension is based upon an asset
with temporarily reduced value. The intent is to postpone a present liquidation at a substantial loss in the hope that changing conditions will create a better value for a subsequent
liquidation.
99. For examples of recent litigation concerning the buyout form of reorganization, see
Coleman v. Global Ultimacc Systems, Inc., No. 85 Civ. 8467 (LLS), 1986 WL 5804
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1986); Enserch Corp. v. McLane Gas Co., 633 A.2d 369 (Del. Super. Ct.
1993).
100. See U.L.P.A. § 2 (1916) (requiring all partners to sign and swear to the certificate
of limited partnership); U.L.P.A. § 25(1)(b) (requiring all partners to sign and swear to any
amendment to the certificate). To the extent that even one limited partner holds out, a cash
buy out of that partner could prove exceedingly expensive and totally counter productive in
terms of its impact on other partners. The problem is worse in the real world of large modem tax shelter limited partnerships due to the large number of interests involved.
101. While variations of "cram downs" are commonplace in other reorganizations, such
as insolvency, the term can have a broader meaning indicating the forced acceptance of a
transaction when some predefined level of voluntary acceptance has been reached.
102. See, e.g., R.U.L.P.A. § 302 (1985) (providing wide discretion for the partnership
agreement to grant or restrict voting power of the limited partners).
103. R.U.L.P.A. § 302 (1985) (providing the authority of the partnership agreement to
allocate voting power of limited partners); R.U.L.P.A. § 303 (1985) (describing actions which
may be taken by limited partners without participating in control of the business).
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ly provides that limited partners may vote on matters which transfer all or
substantially all of the assets of the partnership without destroying their limited liability status." 4 Thus, RULPA seems to contemplate terms in partnership agreements providing for a common form of business reorganization: the
sale, lease, or exchange of all or substantially all of an entity's assets, not in
the regular course of business.0 5
In this manner, the partnership agreement could provide for a successful
reorganization buyout. First, a successful exchange offer to limited partnership
members would give interests in the new company to a majority (or supermajority) of limited partners. As a result of the exchange, the new company
would own more than the required number of "old" limited partnership interests. Second, the "cramdown" would be accomplished by selling the assets of
the old limited partnership to the new company, while the "old" limited partnership would receive interests in the new company equivalent to those accepted in the voluntary exchange. Finally, the transaction would be completed
by the dissolution of the "old" limited partnership and a distribution in
kind"° of the interests in the new company to the remaining recalcitrant limited partners, thus completing the cramdown.
In summary, the RULPA, through its liberal approach to flexible control
via the partnership agreement, allows for the reorganization of a limited partnership through a voluntary exchange of interest, provided a sufficiently large
voluntary transaction can be accomplished.
C. Sale of Assets
A third avenue for modifying the term of a limited partnership is the
negotiation of a sale of the limited partnership's assets to a new entity,
through the old owners."0 7 There are two problems with this form of reorganization.
First, a disclosure documents would be required explaining the complex
implications of this simple transaction, including an explanation of the assets
sold and the new interests purchased. °S Furthermore, if the general partner(s)
received different consideration than the limited partners, complex descriptions
of the difference and equivalence would need to be included. Even if the
general partner(s) received the same form of consideration as the limited partners, description of equivalency would be complex.J" In addition, the disclo104. R.U.L.P.A. § 303(b)(6)(ii) (1985).
105. Id. This traditional form of reorganizations is found in all corporate statutes and is
one recognized form of reorganization in the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 368(a)(I)(C)
(1988).
106. R.U.L.P.A. § 605 (1985) (indicating substantial latitude in the partnership agreement
as to provisions for distributions in kind).
107. The RULPA permits this type of reorganization by allowing limited partners to vote
on matters concerning the sale, exchange, or other transfer of all or substantially all of the
limited partnership's assets without losing limited liability. R.U.L.P.A. § 303(b)(6)(ii) (1985).
108. The disclosure document would be required for the limited partners' information and
accurate record keeping. See R.U.L.P.A. §§ 105, 305 (1985).
109. This transaction as an artificial model is complex due to its two-step nature. The
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sure itself creates risks of misrepresentation and the sale arguably contains
risks of indirect unfairness.
The second problem with an asset sale would involve the efforts required
to procure votes in favor of the transaction. The complexity of the information
might require professional solicitation of positive votes. Even without such
outside assistance, the process would be costly.
If these difficulties are surmounted, dissolution of the old partnership
would result in a distribution in kind. The dissolution could take place on the
natural date of dissolution in the certificate of limited partnership."' Alternatively, the transaction may render the old limited partnership subject to judicial
dissolution because no assets would be available to "carry on the business in
conformity with the partnership agreement.'' A distribution in kind would
be essential," 2 and depending upon the assets received as consideration for
the sale, flexibility would exist"' once all creditors were paid.' 4
The asset sale approach would obviate the tender offer described in Section II.B. The tender offer, with incentives, might be a possible alternative if
the necessary votes for a sale of assets are in doubt.
D. Merger
If several limited partnerships exist, either independently or in affiliation,
the sale of assets model becomes unnecessarily complex."5 Extending the
dissolution dates of such a number of entities, however, may also be accomplished by a merger." 6

sale of assets must result in the receipt by the old limited partnership entity of interests in,
the new entity as consideration for the physical assets sold. These interests, which would be
the only assets of the old entity, would be distributed in kind upon the dissolution of the
old limited partnership. Because the old limited partnership had at least two different kinds
of owners that distribution would be complex depending upon the intended capitalization of
the new entity.
110. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(1) (1985).
Ill. R.U.L.P.A. § 802 (1985).
112. R.U.L.P.A. § 605 (1985) (implying that the partnership agreement may compel
acceptance of a distribution in kind).
113. Statutory limitations on distributions inter se are conditioned by the partnership
agreement and thereafter subject to proportionality of interests. Under U.L.P.A. § 23 (1916)
priorities between limited and general partners made this form of distribution extremely complicated. Under R.U.L.P.A. § 804(2)-(3) (1985), the lack of priority makes distributions in
kind less complicated.
114. R.U.L.P.A. § 804(l) (1985).
115. The multiple organizations may have differing dissolution dates, different voting
procedures, different distribution agreements, different general partnership requirements, all of
which, when folded into the formal sale of assets/distribution in kind model, result in too
complex a transaction.
116. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § I1.01(a) (1984) (providing for statutory mergers). Common law courts also recognize the concept of a merger. See, e.g., Farris
v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958) (recognizing de facto mergers). Additionally,
the Internal Revenue Code includes mergers within its definition of corporate reorganizations.
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (West 1994).
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Neither the UPA, ULPA, nor the RULPA provide explicit authorization
for mergers. However, the UPA, arguably, provides implicit authorization for
such transactions. The process for finding such implied authorization is not
straightforward, but it can be persuasive in the event of a challenge.
Two arguments support the idea that the UPA impliedly authorizes mergers. First, since no actions prior to the merger itself seem to serve as a basis
for a judicial decree of dissolution under the UPA," 7 it can be argued that
such mergers are authorized. The UPA defines a dissolution as "a change in
the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in
the carrying on ... of the business.""' Under this definition, a merger
would not seem to cause a dissolution, because a partner does not necessarily
have to discontinue her association with the business after the merger.
The second argument supporting the notion of "implied authorization" is
dependant on the first; it can only be argued if it is agreed that a merger does
not effect a dissolution of the partnership. If it is agreed, the resolution of the
legal issues incident to the merger would be governed by section 5 of the
UPA,"9 and section 29 of the ULPA, 2 ° which state that the rules of law
and equity, including the law merchant, are to govern. Accordingly, unless a
court determined that conduct prior to the merger violated some rule of law or
equity, the merger would be permissible under the UPA and ULPA. It should
be noted that under the RULPA, such a merger would be permissible if the
terms for approving it were specified in the partnership agreement or its provi2
sions for amendment. '
In corporate reorganizations, proposals to merge usually require approval

117. Section 32 of the UPA states the instances in which a judicial decree of dissolution
is required; mergers are not specifically mentioned. U.P.A. § 32 (1914). Arguably, however,
actions prior to a merger could trigger a judicial decree of dissolution under the "catch-all"
provision listed in section 32. See U.P.A. § 32(l)(f) (1914) (stating that on application by or
for a partner the court shall decree a dissolution whenever circumstances render a dissolution
equitable); cf. R.U.L.P.A. § 802 (1985) (stating that a court may decree a dissolution whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the partnership agreement); see also R.U.L.P.A. § 801(1) (1985) (stating that the certificate of limited partnership can specify a time for dissolution); R.U.L.P.A. § 801(2) (1985) (stating that a
partnership can be dissolved upon the happening of events specified in writing in the partnership agreement). Under the RULPA, then, the partners can agree in advance, either in the
certificate of limited partnership or in the partnership agreement, that certain events preceding
a merger will trigger a dissolution. Absent such a written provision, however, RULPA, like
the UPA, offers judges little guidance to help them determine whether to decree a dissolution.
118. U.P.A. § 29 (1914).
119. U.P.A. § 5 (1914).
120. U.L.P.A. § 29 (1916).
121. See R.U.L.P.A. § 301(b)(1) (1985). This section states that a person can acquire a
partnership interest directly from the limited partnership if the partnership agreement so provides. Id. Because RULPA includes corporations, associations, trusts, estates, and other limited partnerships within its definition of "person," a merger of one or more limited partnerships would be permissible under RULPA if it was provided for in the partnership agreement. See R.U.L.P.A. § 101(11) (1985) (defining person for purposes of the Act).
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by management,22 and subsequent approval by some agreed-upon majority
or super-majority of shareholders. 23 In a limited partnership scenario, the
parallel for management approval is approval by the general partners, and the
equivalent of shareholder approval is approval by the limited partners.
Under old state statutes shareholders were required to approve a merger
by at least a majority of the shares.'24 With the advent of non-voting shares
newer state statutes, and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, only
require a vote of "shareholders entitled to vote."'" Corporations can use this
provision to substantially limit the classes of shareholders entitled to vote,
unless some outside agency requires otherwise.' 26
Similarly, under the RULPA, limited partnerships can limit the classes of
limited partners entitled to vote.'27 The Act expressly states that the partnership agreement "may grant to all or a specified group of limited partners the
right to vote (on a per capita or other basis) upon any matter."'' 28 Arguably, a
court of equity applying equitable considerations could place limitations on
such a voting procedure. Thus, under the RULPA, the partnership agreement
can provide that a certain voting procedure be used in the event of a merger.
If the procedure is used to restrict certain limited partners' right to vote, it
may be possible to extend the life of the limited partnership.
E. Outsider Transactions
All of the previously discussed methods for extending the life of a limited
partnership have assumed general partners or other internal investors are the
moving force behind the transaction. The impetus for the transaction, however,
may also come from "outsiders."
Certain circumstances must ordinarily be present, however, for an "outsider" to take an interest in extending the life of a limited partnership. First, some
incentive must stimulate the interest of the outsider. If the underlying assets
are be currently depressed, the future of the assets must appear bright. Second,
the outsider must believe that the cost of interests in the extended entity (old
or new) will be based upon relative present values. Third, because most of the
entities under consideration will be controlled by one or more general partners,129 a deal must be struck whereby the outsider is admitted as a general
122.
123.

See REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, § 11.03(b) (1984).
See REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, § 11.03(e) (1984).

124. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 52 (Starr & Curtiss 1885) (requiring a twothirds vote of the shareholders to consolidates a business).
An exception to the rule requiring majority approval, arises when a parent corporation
attempts to merge with one of its subsidiaries and the parent corporation owns 90% or more
of the subsidiary's stock. In such circumstances, no vote of the shareholders is statutorily

required. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.04 (1984).
125. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.03(b)(2) (1984).
126. Stock exchange or self regulatory organizations can provide additional protection for
shareholders of corporations traded under their auspices. See, e.g., American Stock Erchange,
Constitution and Rules (CCH 1993).

127.
128.
129.

R.U.L.P.A. § 302 (1985).
Id.
See R.U.L.P.A. § 403(a) (1985) (stating that a general partner of a limited partner-
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partner and control of the entity is shifted to her. 3'
Certain ULPA provisions governing dissolutions, however, can make the
"outsider" approach both risky and problematical. For instance, section 20
states that the retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner will dissolve
the partnership.' Additionally, section 16 states that a limited partner may
have the partnership dissolved when she rightfully demands the return of her
contribution, 1 2 or when the partnership is insolvent and she is entitled to the
return of her contribution. 3 Thus, under the ULPA, the "outsider" method
for extending the life of a limited partnership can result in an unintended
dissolution.
Outsider intervention under the RULPA is also risky. A partnership may
be dissolved under RULPA: (1) upon the happening of events specified in the
partnership agreement;' 34 (2) with the unanimous consent of all
members; 35 (3) upon the withdrawal of a general partner if there is no continuation agreement; 36 and (4) when a judge, in her discretion, finds that it
is impracticable to carry on the business in conformity with the partnership
agreement.'37 Absent persuasive terms in the partnership agreement, therefore, outsider intervention under the RULPA may also result in an unintended
dissolution. However, the partnership agreement can be written to largely limit
this risk under the more flexible RULPA.
F. "Special" Statutory Regulation
Although the Uniform Acts have been instrumental in shaping modem
partnership law, many state partnership statutes differ significantly from the
Acts. Craig Smith, one of the drafters of the 1988 revision to the Delaware
limited partnership statute, has noted that the Delaware statute was revised to
provide for the reorganization of limited partnerships.'38 In addition to Del-

ship, unless otherwise provided, has the same rights and powers as she would have if she
were in a partnership without limited partners); see also U.P.A § 18(e) (1914) (stating that
all partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business);
cf R.U.L.P.A. § 303(a) (1985) (stating that a limited partner will lose her limited liability,
and be liable as a general partner, if she participates in the control of the business).
130. Under the ULPA, the admission of an additional general partner requires the written
consent or ratification of all the limited partners. U.L.P.A. § 9(l)(e) (1916). However, under
the RULPA, the partnership agreement can provide a procedure for admitting additional general partners without the consent or ratification of the limited partners. R.U.L.P.A. § 401
(1985).
131. U.L.P.A. § 20 (1916). There are two exceptions to this rule of automatic dissolution. First, the partnership will not be dissolved if the partnership agreement explicitly provides for continuation of the business under the circumstances. Second, the partnership will
not be dissolved if all members consent to its continuation. Id.
132. U.L.P.A. § 16(4)(a) (1916).
133. U.L.P.A. § 16(4)(b) (1916).
134. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(l) (1985).
135. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(3) (1985).
136. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(4) (1985).
137. R.U.L.P.A. § 802 (1985).
138. Craig B. Smith, Limited Partnerships-Expanded Opportunities Under Delaware's
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aware, Eight other states and the District of Columbia have revised their codes
to allow for limited partnership reorganizations.'39 Because these ten jurisdictions expressly provide for limited partnership mergers, an "implied" analysis,
as described earlier,"4 is unnecessary.
In Delaware, limited partnerships, irrespective of whether they survive, are
permitted to merge or participate in a consolidation with corporations, other
limited partnerships, trusts, limited liability companies, and other partnerships. "' The Delaware statute also includes formal procedures for recording
the merger or consolidation,' and a protective provision to avoid the risk of
dissolution. 4 All of these procedures, however, are subject to broad variation by agreement."
Importantly, however, statutes that expressly provide for limited partnership reorganizations are relatively new, and appear in very few states. Whether
such a reorganization will be allowed in a particular state will depend on that
state's interpretations of the ULPA and the RULPA. As stated earlier, these
two Acts, at best, only impliedly authorize mergers and other forms of reorganization.
III.

CAUSES OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP REORGANIZATIONS

It is useful to identify the economic events and changes in the tax law
which brought into focus the dire straits of many limited partnership investors) 45 The recognition that an effective limited partnership tax shelter re-

Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 43, 51-58 (1990).
139. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 41-428 (1990 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 149-206.1 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-16-3-12 (Burns 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1609
(1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 10-208 (1993 & Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 79-14-211 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-42-320 (Law Co-op. 1990); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 61-2-211 (1989 & Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-I (West
Supp. 1995).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 119-23.
141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-211(a)-(b) (1993 & Supp. 1994).
142. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-211(c) (1993).
143. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-211(h) (1993) (stating that, unless otherwise
agreed, the merger or consolidation of a limited partnership shall not require the dissolution
of that partnership).
144. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-211(b) (1993) (stating the procedure for approval
of a merger but recognizing that the partnership agreement may set forth a different procedure).
Thus, according to the Delaware Code, if a partnership agreement contains -a provision
restricting the right of limited partners to vote on a merger, the restriction is binding. Id.
Such a procedure for extending the life of a limited partnership may be of utility to general
partners who desire to merge but do not believe they, have the support of the limited partners.

145. It is premature at this point in the article to attempt to identify the proportion of
limited partnership investors' losses which resulted from reorganization transactions and the
proportion which resulted from economic conditions prior to those transactions. The problem
is exaggerated by the lack of a market for the interests involved. When the transaction occurs, it often creates a market, which for the first time since purchase, objectively defines
the value of the interest.
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quires a combination of certain characteristics is necessary to this analysis.
First, the optimal investment would include as many investors as possible. The
underlying assets in operation would produce a reasonable cash flow, returnable to the investor in periodic payments. In the tax shelter setting, these payments would not constitute a taxable event. Second, the operational use of
those assets would result in substantial taxable deductions avoiding substantial
pass-through tax liability for investors, and perhaps even creating pass-through
tax losses to shelter investors' other taxable income. Deductions could include
interest expenses in highly leveraged operations, large depreciation or depletion allowances, and any other deductions which could be loaded into the early
years of the investment, especially if the actual cash drain for the deduction
would be postponable. Finally, assets would ideally retain value and be subject
to sale subsequent to the final liquidation of the limited partnership. That sale
might constitute a taxable event due to reduced bases in assets, but it would
occur at an advantageous tax rate for the pass-through investor.
For the high tax-rate investor, this shelter would ideally provide a period
of regular cash flow with little or no tax liability, or even tax losses followed
by a cash draw at an attractive tax rate.
One of the most traditional investments used to accomplish these goals
was commercial real estate, including office buildings, shopping centers, industrial properties, urban hotels, and resorts.' 46 A second category of such
investments lay in the oil and gas industry, including exploration, drilling,
ownership of fields, and production." 7
The effectiveness of limited partnerships as tax shelter investment vehicles
led to a wider, even exotic, range of investments. Limited partnerships invested in: computers and computer software; 8 residential real estate; 49 and
horse breeding. 5" Changes in the climate surrounding these investments,
however, began to take their toll in the mid-1980s.

146. The Equitec partnerships provide an example. These real estate partnerships were
rolled up into a master limited partnership known as Hallwood Realty Partners. Hallwood
now has more than 3,000 limited partners, and in 1990 owned, directly or indirectly through
joint ventures, 19 major properties in 9 states. See Amy Friedman, Rolling Peter to Pay
Paul, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Jan. 7 1991, available in LEXIS, Merger Library, IDD
File.
147.

An example of such an investment would be Mesa Limited Partnerships. This com-

plex investment in the oil and gas industry has been transformed back and forth from a corporation to a limited partnership and back to a corporation again. See Odmark v. Mesa Ltd.
Partnership, No. 3:91-CV-2376-X, 1992 WL 203541 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 1992).
148. An example a limited partnership established to sell IBM compatible equipment and
software is STC Ultimacc associates which was eventually rolled up into Global-Ultimacc
Systems. See Coleman v. Global Ultimacc Sys., Inc., No. 85-CIV-8467 (LLS), 1986 WL
5804, (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1986).
149. An example of limited partnerships which invested in federally insured residential
mortgages are AIM 86 and AIM 88 which were the target of a tender offer by a Real Estate Investment Trust. American Insured Mortgage

Investors, Inc. v. CRI, Inc., 1991 Fed.

Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,730 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
150. An example of limited partnerships which invested in breeding stock are the
Kinderhill limited partnerships whose interests were privately placed and eventually rolled up

into a master limited partnership. Bruce v. Martin, 691 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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A. Economic Events
In the oil and gas industry, one of the modes of choice for limited partnerships, prices generally plummeted after 1985: 5'

1980
1982
1984
1986
1988

Yearly Consumer Price Index for Energy
86.0
1981
97.71
99.2
1983
99.9
100.9
1985
101.6
88.2
1987
88.6
89.3
1989
94.3

The drop-off in natural gas and petroleum crude was even more dramatic: 152

Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Average Pricesfor Mineral Products
Natural Gas ($/1000cu ft)
Petroleum ($/bbl.)
1.6
21.6
2.0
31.8
2.5
28.5
2.6
26.2
2.7
25.9
2.5
24.1
1.9
12.5
1.7
15.4
1.7
12.6
1.7
15.9

Because of the drop in prices investments dependent upon natural gas or
crude oil were negatively impacted. Limited partnerships investing in this
industry typically generated lower cash flows after 1985. Additionally, those
partnerships that were due for liquidation during this period were often forced
to liquidate their assets at a greatly reduced value.
Similarly, investments in commercial real estate suffered from increased
office building vacancy rates during this period. 5 '
Yearly Office Building Vacancy Rates (% of available space)
1980
4.6
1983
13.5

151.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
THE UNITED STATES 478 (1991).

152.
153.

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

Id. at 488.
Id. at 732 (rates for 1981 and 1982 are not available).

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
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1984
1986
1988

15.5
18.6
18.6

1985
1987
1989
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16.9
19.0
19.5

Major cities, home to many limited partnerships, reflected similar
trends: 5
Office Building Vacancy Rates in Selected Cities
Atlanta, Georgia:
4.6% in 1980; 21% in 1985
Boston, Massachusetts:
7.2% in 1980; 15.9% in 1986
Chicago, Illinois:
7.0% in 1980; 19.6 in 1986
Dallas, Texas:
8.6% in 1980; 30.9% in 1986
Los Angeles, CA:
0.9% in 1980; 19.0 in 1987
San Francisco, CA:
0.4% in 1980; 16.6% in 1986
From 1988-89, leasable space growth in large shopping centers also declined. While smaller centers grew at an 8.9% rate, centers with 800,000 to
1,000,000 square feet of leasable space grew at only 3.7%, and those with
over 1,000,000 square feet grew at only 5.1%.' The weak economy and the
reduced growth of large shopping centers helped contribute to the 0.2% overall
reduction in retail sales per square foot that occurred between 1988 and
1989. 156
Thus, the value of various assets underlying many limited partnerships
declined during the 1980's. Two specific impacts must be noted. First, unless
the partnership was a publicly traded partnership, no information was available
about this reduction in value through the marketplace. Thus, limited partnership investors had no means of quantifying the diminution of their
investments' value. Second, for those interests that were due for liquidation
during periods of asset devaluation, the forced nature of the sale exacerbated
that decline in value.
In order to avert these potential disasters, limited partnerships would engage in "roll-up" transactions. "Roll-ups" would reduce risk by combining the
assets of multiple limited partnerships into a single, larger, and more diversified, "liquidation-extended" entity. The "roll-up" itself would require some
form of investor approval and some disclosure of diminished values. The
surviving entity of the "roll-up" would often include liquid resulting interests,
thereby causing an immediate market disclosure of highly reduced investment
value.

154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id. at 777.
Id.
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B. Changes in the Law
During the 1980s, the federal government addressed the need to raise
more revenue and reacted to wealthy taxpayers' manipulation of tax shelters.
The government focus on these areas resulted in a major modification of the
taxation of limited partnerships and their investors.
The basic model for the partnership tax scheme is established by subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC").'" According to the IRC, the
partnership, as an entity, is not required to pay taxes. 5 8 Rather, the
partnership's taxable income is allocated to the individual partners for inclusion in their individual returns.'59 Thus, taxes "pass through" the partnership
to reach the individual. While this tax scheme appears simple, it becomes
more complex when "distributive shares'" are passed through as both income and deductions.
The partnership taxation model has many advantages, including: (1) taxes
are only paid by the partner, in contrast to the corporate form in which taxes
are paid twice; once by the corporation as an entity; and once by the individu-6
al shareholders if and when they receive dividends from the corporation;1 1
(2) if a partnership is engaged in business with deferred income cash flow
distributions to partners, the partners may be able to avoid an immediate
tax; 162 (3) if the partnership business is highly leveraged and/or produces
non-cash expenses such as depreciation or depletion resulting in entity losses,
these losses are immediately deductible to the partner; 63 and (4) because
after the dissolution and sale of the partnership assets the final distribution is
taxed as a current distribution, the possibility for capital gains treatment exists.
These generalizations are, of course, subject to limitations; a detailed discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article."
While partnerships continue to enjoy many tax advantages today, 65 the
Tax Reform Act of 1986,'" and the Revenue Act of 1987, 67 eradicated
many of the tax advantages partnerships had previously enjoyed. These two
acts were equally as devastating to limited partnerships as the economic

I.R.C. §§ 701-61 (West 1994).
i.R.C. § 701 (West 1994). But see I.R.C. § 7704 (West 1994) (stating that certain
publicly traded partnerships may be given corporate tax treatment).
159. I.R.C. § 701 (West 1994).
160. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 704 (West 1994) (concerning distributive shares).
161. I.R.C. § 701 (West 1994).
162. I.R.C. § 731(a) (West 1994).
163. I.R.C. § 704(d) (West 1994).
164. While a full discussion of these limitations is beyond the scope of this article, they
do not affect the basic concepts underlying the tax treatment of limited partnerships .
165. See generally Donna D. Adler, Master Lintited Partnerships, 40 U. FLA. L. REV.
755 (1988) (discussing the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Revenue Act of 1987, and their
respective impacts on the tax treatment of master limited partnerships).
166. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.).
167. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-382 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
157.

158.
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changes discussed in Section III.A were.
The IRC now places tight restrictions on the ability of a partner to utilize
partnership deductions. For instance, § 704(d) limits a partner's distributive
share of the partnership's capital and non-capital losses."6 A partner can only deduct partnership loss to the extent of the adjusted basis of the partner's
interest in the partnership at the end of the partnership year in which the loss
occurred.169 Any loss distributed to the partner in excess of the adjusted basis
is suspended, for70 personal deduction purposes, until an increased basis becomes available.1
A similar loss limitation is found in § 465, which limits losses allowable
under § 704(d). 17 ' This additional limitation applies to losses resulting from
deductions which exceed income from the partner's distributive share.' Section 465 limits these losses to the partner's interests at risk. The losses, however, can exceed the partner's adjusted basis because they include, in addition
to the partner's investment, those debts for which the partner is liable. Section
465 has less of an impact on limited partnerships, however, because of the
limited liability of limited partners.
The passive activity loss provisions of § 469 carry much stronger meaning
for limited partnership interests. It defines "passive activity" as "any activity
which involves the conduct of a trade or business, and, in which the taxpayer
does not materially participate."'' 73 This definition includes normal business
activity, but excludes purely passive income resulting from portfolio
transactions that do not constitute a trade or business activity.' Such passive income or loss is treated specially: passive losses may only be offset
against passive income.'75 This creates a major limitation on the use of distributive losses generated by tax shelter partnerships.
Other portions of section 469 carry even stronger consequences for limited
partnerships. First, limited partnership interests can never become material
participation in the activity of the partnership. 7 6 Second, in a publicly traded
limited partnership, losses cannot be offset against passive income.' 77 Third,
the section severely limits a partner's ability to utilize losses from special
activities typical of tax shelter limited partnerships.7 7 Additionally, the section limits a partner's ability
to deduct investment interest (a considerable
79
expense in tax shelters).
Finally, new limitations exist on the according of partnership tax status to

168.
169.
170.

I.R.C. § 704(d) (West 1994).
Id.
Id.

171.

I.R.C. § 465 (West 1994).

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
I.R.C.
Id.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

§ 469(c)(1)(A)-(B) (West 1994).

§
§
§
I.R.C. §
I.R.C. §

469(d)(1) (West 1994).
469(h)(2) (West 1994).
469(c)(1) (West 1994).
469(i) (West 1994).
163(d) (West 1994).
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publicly traded limited partnerships, regardless of their legal status as limited
partnerships." If a secondary market is maintained for interests, the publicly
traded limited partnership risks being taxed as a corporation. To escape this
treatment, the partnership must realize 90% of its income from statutorily
defined sources of passive "qualifying" income, or income resulting from the
disposition of capital assets held for the production of income.'
These tax changes proved devastating to limited partners. Investment
programs designed to generate pass-through losses resulted in losses unavailable to shelter other income. Attempts to create liquidity, by creating markets
for the interests, resulted in greater restrictions on the use of these losses to
shelter even other passive income. Publicly traded partnerships risked treatment as a corporation for tax purposes. From a tax perspective, the value of
these investments deteriorated substantially. In many situations, the absence of
a market for the interests masked the extent of the erosion in value.
C. Roll-ups: Strategies and Reactions
The economic events and tax changes of the late 1980s forced those with
partnership interests into a reactive mode. General partners, investment advisors, and financial specialists who marketed these interests, devised a strategy
including two goals: (1) the extension of liquidation dates to avoid liquidation
in a depressed market; and (2) the combination of entities to attempt diversification and provide liquidity. The strategy most often used to address these
economic and tax problems was the roll-up of limited partnerships.
1. The Roll-up Strategy
The procedure employed to roll-up limited partnerships created fertile
grounds for abuse.' 82 One aspect of the procedure that was often abused concerned disclosure. A typical roll-up required disclosure of information material
to limited partners' interests, including analysis of present risk, analysis of
risks involved in extending liquidation and maintaining the investment, and
analysis of the risks implicit in negotiating with lenders in highly leveraged
enterprises. Many of these items were often not disclosed.
Another area of abuse concerned the solicitation of investor approval for
the roll-up. In order to garner the affirmative votes required, solicitation of
formal approval was often necessary. Independent market professionals, whose
fee depended on a successful solicitation, often employed aggressive tactics to
gain the requisite votes for approval.
Another aspect of the procedure that was often abused concerned the
valuation of general partners' interests; disclosure of the results was geometrically more complex than the problem of valuing limited partners' interests. In
addition to valuation, new management compensation agreements were

180.
181.
182.

See I.R.C. § 7704 (West 1994).
Id.
See infra note 197.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:2

needed. They required some compensation for termination of the old agreement, for services performed in accomplishing the roll-up, and for future management services to the new entity. Even more complexity resulted from the
merging of multiple entities. Underlying this entire procedure was the risk that
a conflict of interests could arise during the creation of the new relationship
and negotiation of the successful transaction. It is easy to see how these problems created a fertile ground for abuse.
2. Reactions to Roll-up Abuses
Three independent forums verified the reality of these potential problems.
As the transactions began to occur, the financial press began documenting the
abuses.'83 Thereafter, congressional hearings detailed the abuses,"s and finally, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reported the results of
its roll-up studies to Congress.' 85 Selected documentation from each of these
sources describes a pattern of intentional and fraudulent activity in some cases,
and inept mismanagement in others. The reports also criticized the inherent
complexity of the roll-up transaction. This documentation ultimately created a
perception of abused investors suffering overwhelming investment losses.
a. The Financial Press
The financial press has been generally critical of the results of roll-ups. A
1988 article in Forbes magazine posited that:
Last October's market crash and 1987 tax law change have made
roll-ups into master limited partnerships much less palatable these
days . . .[N]othing in the tax law is likely to change a long standing

rule of limited partnership investment: The operator almost always
does well, even if the investors fare terribly."
The National Realty, L.P. roll-up, for example, involved 20,000 limited
partners in 35 limited partnerships. Assets were represented to investors to
have appraised values of $10 per share in the new roll-up. After approval, the
interests opened on the American Stock Exchange at a little over $3 per unit, a
shattering 70% discount from the appraised value.' The article further documented the benefits received by the general partners of the rolled-up limited
partnerships. 88 "'Every single roll-up done to date has done harm to the investors,' said Barry Vinocur, editor of Stanger's Investment Advisor, which
follows the investment industry. 'There are varying degrees of disaster, but
they've all worked out badly."""

183. See infra part IIl.C.2.a.
184. See infra part IlI.C.2.b.
185. See infra part II1.C.2.c.
186. Howard Rudnitsky, Roll-Up as Rip-Off, FORBES, Jan. 1988, at 254.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 254-256.
189. Mary Rowland, Your Own Accounts; The Hazards of Roll-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1990, at A3.
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A 1991 article in Investment Dealers Digest quotes roll-up critics as saying:
[G]eneral partners have paid themselves lavish fees, ranging from
acquisition fees for each property bought for a partnership to ongoing
management fees for upkeep and maintenance that sometimes exceeded the cash flow available from the leases. Then, when the partnerships were mere carcasses, with the most properties sold and the
worst given back to the lenders.. . The general partners proposed to
change the agreements by 'rolling up' a group of partnership into one
investment, ostensibly to improve liquidity, allow the assets to work
harder for the limited partners and create (or enhance) the available
cash flow."°
A 1991 Boston Globe article described in detail the specific losses of
individual investors and noted that over 300,000 investors lost $1.6 billion in
five years. 9 A Los Angeles Times article the same year cited Richard
Wollack, Chairman of Liquidity Fund, in noting that limited partners' interests
dropped an average of 44% on their first day of trading following 13 different
roll-ups.'92 A 1992 FinancialWorld article posited:
Roll ups in themselves are not bad. Some have served investors
well. . . During the 14 months ended Dec. 31, shares of traditional
real estate investment trusts climbed 32%, but those of roll ups fell
11%. And the 20 roll ups completed in 1991 lost almost 50% of their
initial value before years end. Clearly something has gone dreadfully
wrong with the roll up concept."'
Finally, a 1992 San Francisco Chronicle article produced the most extreme commentary:
The stain of abusive roll-ups ... started spreading across America in
the 1980's. To date, more than 500,000 limited partners have witnessed their equity plummet an average of 70 percent in these illfated 'deals', every single one of which has been a loser for victimized investors. However, roll-ups have been a bonanza for general
partners and investment bankers, who have reaped tens of millions of
dollars in fees."9

190. Amy Friedman, Rolling Peter to Pay Paul, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Jan. 7,
1991, available in LEXIS, Merger Library, IDD File.
191. Michael K. Frisby, Loopholes, Investor Losses Spur House Probe of "Roll-ups",
Boston Globe, Mar. 20, 1991, at I.
192. Catherine Collins, Washington; Proposals Aim to Protect Investors When Partnerships Are "Rolled-up", L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1991, at D2.
193. Ronald Fink, Rollup Roundup, FIN. WORLD, Mar. 31, 1992, at 100.
194. Richard G. Wollack, Partnership Roll-ups Hurt Small Investors, Economy, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 24, 1992, at D 5.
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b. Congressional Hearings
Testimony at congressional hearings provided a major source for the
overwhelmingly negative information in the financial press about roll-up abuses. Excerpts from some of these hearings are set forth below.
On October 3, 1990, the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, of the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce,
held hearings on limited partnerships. Testimony was given regarding not only
roll-up abuses, but also the importance of reorganization transactions to investors. Two of the witnesses emphasized the value of properly structured "rollups," and the pressing need to eradicate abuses in the process to preserve the
"roll-up" as an effective reorginazational tool.
Christopher Davis, President of the Investment Partnership Association,
testified early in the hearings. His organization was described as a trade group
for limited partnership program sponsors and their principal selling organizations. With an openly disclosed bias, his organization claimed to represent the
"interests of approximately 10 1/2 million Americans."'' 5 The needs cited for
limited partnership reorganizations included the long-term nature of interests,
the depressed value of assets due to their illiquidity, and the financial difficulties of managing general partners." 9 After discussing claims regarding abuses of the process and recommendations for controlling the specific abuses,'97
Davis stated the position of his organization:
"as in all matters of public policy and debate among differing interests, the
IPA believes the issue of partnership roll-ups or consolidations is one of balance. Policy makers must distinguish between abusive practices and the efforts
of general partners to improve the performance of inadequately performing
investments." ' The organization's recommendations included improved
disclosure to protect both investors and important economic transactions.
Cezar Froelich, a partner in the law firm of Shefsky and Froelich in Chicago, also testified.' Froelich emphasized the need for roll-up transactions.
He argued that new layers of regulation would operate to the disadvantage of
investors. 2 In place of restrictive regulation, Froelich argued for increased

195. Limited Partnerships: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1990) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Mr.
Christopher Davis).
196. Id. at 45.
197. The specific abuses recognized in the testimony were inadequate disclosure generally, inadequacy of research supporting fairness opinions, lack of recognition of the impact of
market effects on underlying assets and the form of resulting interests from the roll-up, problems between finite and infinite life investments, lack of a system for appraisal rights, problems inherent in voting requirements, lack of board of independent trustees, and payment for
votes approving transactions. Id. at 51-52.
198. Id. at 52.
199. House Hearings, supra note 196, at 92 (statement of Mr. Cezar Froelich).
200. Id. at 97 n.12. The cited advantages include: (I) creation or enhancement of
investors' liquidity, (2) diversification of underlying assets, (3) increased access to capital
sources, (4) potential for growth, (5) increased distributions to investors, and (6) cost savings
and operating efficiencies. Id.
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disclosure to resolve perceived detriments,"' and maintain adequate investor
protection."'
Hearings before House 23 and Senate21 committees were held again in
1991. Frank Wilson, of the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"9),2 5 argued before the Senate that agencies and Self-Regulatory
Organizations ("SROs") had the rule-making power to address roll-up abuses. 2' 6 Dee Harris, of the North American Securities Administrators Association, 7indicated that state regulations already effectively policed this prob20
lem.
c. The SEC's Response
The second round of hearings included the SEC's study, results, and posi' Chairman Richard Breeden testified that the SEC had serious concern
tion.00
about roll-up abuses. Breeden stated that $150 billion in limited partnership
interests were registered with the SEC and tens of billions more were sold in
unregistered private placements during the 1980s.2°' He added that "[s]ince
1985, 65 roll up transactions involving approximately 1200 entities with an
aggregate exchange value of about $6.9 billion have been registered with the
Commission. '21 0
The SEC prepared a major report on those transactions in February
1991.2"1 Subsequent SEC reports were issued in March 199122 and April

201. Id. (identifying as detriments: (I) securities selling at discounts after the transaction,
(2) increased super-majority voting requirements to protect managers after the transaction, (3)
lack of dissenter rights in the transaction, (4) paid solicitation of votes, (5) extended or
perpetual life durations of new entities, and (6) dilution of investor interests).
202. hI. at 101.
203. Limited Partnerships: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45 (1991) [hereinafter House Hearings #21.
204. See Limited Partnership Reorganizations, or "Roll-ups:" Hearings Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong.
Ist Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Senate Hearingsl.
205. See id. at Ill (statement of Mr. Frank Wilson, executive Vice President of NASD).
206. See id. at 120 (statement of Mr. Frank Wilson):
As a general matter the NASD prefers the flexibility of agency and self regulatory
organization rule making to the rigidity of legislation. To the extent that government agencies or self regulatory organizations do not have the authority to make
the changes discussed above, we would recommend that they be given the necessary rule making authority.
Id.
207. Senate Hearings, supra note 205, at 135 (statement of Mr. Dee Harris) ("For the
federal government is largely reserved the role of coping with truly national and market-wide
problems, including insider trading and mergers and acquisitions. To this list of national
marketplace issues has been added the current roll-up crises.").
208. Senate Hearings, supra note 204, at 71; House Hearings #2, supra note 203, at
187, 419.
209. Senate Hearings, supra note 204, at 73.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 102.
212. See House Hearings #2, supra note 203, at 140.
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1991,23 detailing several critical points. The SEC admitted that the "roll-up"

problem was significant, but contended that investor losses had been exaggerated by reliance on "exchange values" which did not indicate true value.2"4
Second, protective devices were available for investors: (1) adequate information requirements to enable investors to understand the consequences of proposed transactions, (2) state law fiduciary duties of managers owed to passive
investors, (3) voting rights protections for extraordinary transactions, and (4)
recourse to the courts to enforce these protections." 5 Breeden indicated that
the SEC and the SROs had launched attempts to protect investors and noted
that the SEC preferred these initiatives to legislation." 6
IV. PROTECTIVE REACTIONS

Section III detailed the economic and legal causes of roll-ups, as
investors' losses from roll-up transactions. Recent years have seen
attempts by the NASD, the SEC, and, more recently, Congress, to
investors from these losses. This Section will survey these three areas
tective efforts.

well as
various
protect
of pro-

A. The National Association of Securities Dealers
The NASD was concerned that legislative controls could result in overprotection of investors and the destruction of economically valuable transactions in which many NASD members were vitally involved. Due to these
concerns, the NASD proposed rules in January 1992 in hopes of forestalling
congressional action." 7
The NASD Board of Governors approved amendments to its own
ruleS2 8 and proposed a new rule for SEC approval." 9 If adopted, these
rules would permit NASD member participation in roll-up transactions and
allow the resulting securities to be listed for trading on the NASDAQ, contingent upon compliance with a series of restrictions. First, general partners or
sponsors of a proposed roll-up would be required to provide the prior limited
partners with a right to: (a) receive compensation based upon an appraisal of
the partnership assets of the pre-existing limited partnership; or (b) receive or
retain a security with rights, privileges and preferences similar to their prior
units. Second, the transaction's terms could not unfairly reduce or abridge the
voting rights of the prior limited partners. Third, the old investors could not be
required to bear an unfair portion of the costs or the transaction. Finally, no

213. See id. at 419.
214. Id. at 141-43.
215. Id. at 188.
216. Id. at 210.
217. See 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 17 (Jan. 3, 1992).
218. See 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1772 (Nov. 20, 1992). The amendments were
made to "Appendix F to Article III, § 34 of the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice, and Schedule D to the Bylaws, National Association of Securities Dealers. Id. at 1772-73.
219. See 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 189 (Feb. 5. 1993).
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inappropriate restrictions could be imposed on general partner or sponsor
compensation."
Transactions in violation of the rules might still occur because non-NASD
member solicitation specialists could provide roll-up services, and the
NASDAQ is not the only forum available to trade the new entity's interests.
Weak sanctions, combined with ambiguous compliance standards which could
"chill" fair roll-up transactions, severely dilute the value of the NASD's proposal to investors.
B. The Securities and Exchange Commission
The SEC did not wait for SRO action before proposing its own form of
investor protections. Its first step was an interpretive release clarifying the
impact of existing rules on roll-up abuses, accompanied by a release proposing
new rules to supplement existing regulation.22'
Predictably, the SEC's protective scheme centered on improved disclosure
to investors. In the June 1991 release, the SEC identified two critical transactions already covered by current disclosure regulation. First, Section 14 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("the 1934 Act") governed approval of
roll-up transactions,22 if pre-existing interests in a limited partnership were
registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act. 223 Regulation 14A 224 and
Schedule 14A22 would provide guidance on information required for disclosure. This scheme, however, would not encompass the solicitation of interests
not registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act.
Second, and more likely to trigger investor protection disclosure, were
issues of new securities resulting from the roll-up. Section 5 of the Securities
Act of 1933 ("the 1933 Act") 2 6 prohibits the offer, delivery, or sale of a security, absent registration or use of an exemption under the 1933 Act. In the
absence of an exemption 2 7 both the registration statement228 and the prospectuses29 used in the transactions must provide the disclosure.
The SEC had previously developed a large body of instructional regulation regarding statutory disclosure requirements. The required information in a

220. Id.
221. Limited Partnership Reorganizations and Public Offerings of Limited Partnership Interests, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6900, 34-29314, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,979 (1991).
222. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n (West Supp. 1994). This section authorizes the Securities and
Exchange Commission to promulgate rules for the protection of investors in connection with
the solicitation of any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security registered
pursuant to § 781. Id.
223. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78/ (West Supp. 1994).
224. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-14 (1994).
225. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1994).
226. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
227. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c (West Supp. 1994); 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1988).
228. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77f (West Supp. 1994).
229. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1988). This section details required information for prospectuses,
which are defined in 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1988).
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registration statement can be found in three sources. First, Regulation C23°
describes the form of registration statements and the content of prospectuses.
Second Regulation S-K 23 contains the basic instructions for filing disclosure
forms with the SEC. Third. the regulations designated Form S-4 as the primary document to be used as a registration statement in reorganization transactions, including roll-ups, regulated by Rule 145.232
In its June 1991 interpretive release, the SEC identified specific concerns
regarding its present requirement as applied to disclosure in roll-up transactions. Identifying "readability" as the key to adequate disclosure, the release
emphasized pre-existing standards which would have special application to
roll-up transactions. As disclosure regulation is primarily designed to provide
investors with "clear, comprehensible and complete information regarding the
issuer, security, offering transaction and the risks of the investment, 233 the
complexity of roll-up transactions requires meticulous care."' The release
also emphasized the importance of a "clear, concise and coherent 'snapshot'
description of the most significant aspects of ... the transaction or partnership
'
offering"235
in the required summary. '11
The release further highlighted significant issues in roll-up transactions,
including names and descriptions of the entities involved; a brief description
of the transaction itself; existing investor voting rights and any significant
changes resulting from the transaction; changes in the business plans; changes
in management or management compensation; the likelihood that new securities would trade at substantial discounts from disclosed "exchange" valuations;
dissenters' approval rights; reports, opinions or appraisals which served as the
basis for the transaction; a clear description of the risks and benefits of the
proposed transaction; and the importance of the quality or readability of the
disclosure. 37
The SEC next supplemented the existing rules with special roll-up transaction disclosure rules, primarily by adding subpart 900 to Regulation S-K.
These new rules clarified and significantly altered the prior disclosure scheme.
First, they carefully identified the new roll-up disclosure rules as applying only
to combinations or reorganizations of two or more finite limited partnerships,
newly identified "other finite entit[ies]," and reorganizations of one finite
limited partnership or entity into a new entity.2 "3 The new rules thus do not

17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400-.479 (1994).
17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.802 (1994).
17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1994).
233. Limited Partnership Reorganization and Public Offerings of Limited Partnership Interests, supra note 221, at 28,980.
234. Id. See In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964) (discussing requirements for
clear, concise and understandable disclosure).
235. Limited Partnership Reorganization and Public offerings of Limited Partnership Interests, supra note 221, at 28,981.
236. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(a) (1994) (discussing required information for summaries
included in complex prospectuses); 17 C.F.R. § 229.801(e) (1994) (explaining which guide to
follow with respect to preparation of registration statements relating to limited partnerships).
237. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.901-.915 (1994).
238. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.901(c)(1) (1994).
230.
231.
232.
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apply to roll-ups or reorganizations of infinite life entities, REITs, or 1940
Investment Company Act entities.
If the new roll-up definition does not eliminate a transaction, the recently
adopted 900 series regulations impact disclosure in at least three ways. First, if
two or more entities are included in the transaction, a separate supplementary
disclosure document for each entity is required. 3 ' This document provides
investors in each rolled-up entity with special disclosure of significant information concerning the investor's own entity as well as special risks associated
with its roll-up.
Second, the new rules mandate the inclusion of specific disclosure in a
required summary to be located in the forepart of each disclosure document."4° These summary items identify the critical issues subject to abuse.
Accordingly, clear, concise, comprehensible summaries of these issues set out
in the forepart of the disclosure documents should alert investors to these critical issues. Moreover, the 900 series regulations not only identify the specific
areas of required disclosure in detail, 241' but also expand the information provided in the required summaries and add other critical technical data not summarized. Finally, due to the complexity of the transactions and the newly
required disclosures, the SEC required a minimum solicitation period of sixty
242
days.
The effectiveness of disclosure as a method of protection is dependent
upon one of three assumptions. First, the investor may vote his own self-interest once the information to make an appropriate judgment about that self-interest is available. This theory's weakness is evidenced by the SEC's recognition
of the complexity of the transaction. Second, adequate disclosure may permit
study by sophisticated market professionals who will understand these complex transactions. This theory, however, ignores the fact that no market price
is available to broadly disseminate the resultant advice in a timely manner.
Finally, adequate disclosure may serve as a disincentive to unfair transactions,
because insiders not wanting to disclose this information will forgo the transaction completely. This theory, overlooks disclosure's potential chilling effect
on fair transactions. As a result, increased disclosure adds to the cost of the
transaction without assurance that investors will benefit from the information.

239. 17 C.F.R. § 229.902 (1994).
240. . 17 C.F.R. § 229.903 (1994). This section requires disclosure of material risks of the
roll-up transaction in a summary statement. Examples of material risks include changes in
business plans, voting rights, cash distributions, ownership interest, general partner conflicts
of interest with the roll-up, material terms of the transaction, and outside parties' assessments
regarding fairness of the opinions. Id.
241. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.904-.915 (1994). Items listed in these sections include risk
factors, comparative information, allocation of roll-up consideration, background of roll-up
transaction, conflicts of interest, fairness, reports, opinions and appraisals, sources and
amounts of funds and transactional expenses, other provisions in the transaction, pro forma
financial statements and federal income tax consequences. Id.
242. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2(c) (1994). This requirement may only be altered by an
applicable state law permitting a shorter period. Id. Note that the sixty-day minimum applies
to Williams Act tender offers as well. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1994).
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Even less clear is the new disclosure rules' impact on litigation under the
federal securities statutes. As most entities rolled up into new, larger entities
will not have been registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act,21 implied
causes of action2" for disclosure violations of Proxy Rule 14(a)9 24 will be
unavailable. Because registration will usually 24 be required under the 1933
Act, however, misleading disclosure in the registration statement24 7 or other
media may give rise to liability. 24s In cases involving non-disclosure (the majority of cases), the new, itemized disclosure rules could make it difficult to
prove the materiality of facts not specifically mentioned in the rules.
In sum, the SEC's new disclosure rules potentially provide an increased,
more readable flow of information to the investor, without destroying the
potential benefit roll-ups afford. While disclosure skeptics may doubt the
added value of the new rules to investors, increases in disclosure undoubtedly
remediate the extreme abuses identified in the congressional hearings.
C. Congress
Congress's interest in protecting investors injured in roll-up transactions
began in 1990. The first bill, which was virtually ineffective, to combat roll-up
transactions was introduced in May 1990.249 However, April 1991 saw the
introduction of a substantial bill regulating roll-ups? 5 The proposal largely
survived as the bill eventually passed by the House in November 1991.21
Interestingly, the Chairman of the SEC urged Congress to set aside this proposal until the SEC had an opportunity to act.252 In June 1991, however,
Senator Dodd introduced a major roll-up reform measure in the Senate."
The Office of Management and Budget reported the Bush Administration's
opposition to this legislation," based on the notion that (1) it would infringe

243. 15 U.S.C.A. § 781 (West Supp. 1994).
244. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430 (1964) (recognizing that private
parties have a right to bring suit for violations of § 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934).
245. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1994):
246. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1988) requires that all prospectuses shipped in interstate commerce and mails be registered.
247. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988). This section imposes civil liability upon those making
false registration statements. Id.
248. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988). This section imposes civil liability upon those issuing prospectuses which include untrue statements or material omissions. Id.
249. See Daily Report for Executives (BNA) (May 2, 1990).
250. 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 551 (Apr. 19, 1991). (reporting on HR 1885).
251. 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1613 (Nov. 8, 1991).
252. See Kevin G. Salwen, SEC Chief is Wary of Measure to Curb "Roll-Up" Abuses,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1991, at C9. The SEC began discussing its potential involvement in
the area as early as the previous February. See 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 317 (Mar. I,
1991). By June 21, the SEC proposed rule changes for comment. See 23 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 954 (June 21, 1991).
253. Securities - Senator Dodd Introduces Bill to Curb Abuses in Limited Partnership

Rollups, Wash. Insider (BNA) (July 1, 1991).
254. 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1613 (Nov. 8 1991).
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on state partnership law, and (2) the SEC proposal provided adequate protective regulation under existing legislation. The Dodd bill eventually languished
in the Senate.
Soon afterward, however, the Clinton Administration's desire for legislative enhancement of investor protection revived Congress's interest.2" The
House passed a new version of the previous bill in March 1993,256 and by
November 1993, after a new bill was introduced in the Senate,25 a joint bill
passed both houses and was sent to the president."' On December 17, 1993
President Clinton signed into law the Limited Partnership Roll-up Reform Act
of 1993 (hereinafter "the LPRRA" or "the Act")." 9
The LPRRA affected limited partnership roll-ups by making several
amendments to the 1934 Act.26 Comments prior to the House vote indicate
this congressional response to the roll-up debacle considered the SEC's and
NASD's remedial actions. 6' The LPRRA was a product of gaps in that activity, codifying and expanding the rulemaking of these two regulatory bodies.
It is therefore useful to identify those changes.
LPRRA combines patterns of regulatory methods developed under the
1933 and 1934 Acts. The basic substantive regulatory provisions resulted from
an amendment to section 14 of the 1934 Act262 and became the new section
14(h).263 Section 14 provides the SEC with authority to promulgate rules for
transactions in which persons seek proxies, 2" renders it "unlawful" to engage
in such activities in contravention of those rules,265 and limits the application
of those rules to transactions in certain securities.2 New section 14(h)267 is

255. See 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 267 (Feb. 26, 1993).
256. See 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 292 (Mar. 5, 1993) (reporting passage of H.R.
617 on Mar. 2, 1993).
257. 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 268 (Feb. 26, 1993) (reporting the introduction of
S424 by Senators Dodd, Riegle and D'Amato).
258. 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1605 (Dec. 3, 1993) (reporting passage of S422 on
Nov. 22. 1993, and H.R. 617 on Nov. 23, 1993).
259. 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1708 (Dec. 24, 1993).
260. The Amendments to the 1934 Act are a new addition to Section 14, 15 U.S.C.A. §
78n (West Supp. 1994), two new additions to Section 15A(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b) (West
Supp. 1994), and an addition to Section 6(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(b) (West Supp. 1994).
261. See 139 CONG. REC. S422, 10,956-69 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1993 (comments of Congressman Mackey).
262. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n (West Supp. 1994).
263. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h) (West Supp. 1994).
264. Section 14(a) applies to the solicitation of proxies, consents, or authorizations. 15
U.S.C.A. § 78n(a) (West Supp. 1994). Section 14(d) applies to tender offers. 15 U.S.C.A. §
78n(d) (West Supp. 1994). Section 14(e) applies specifically to disclosures in connection with
tender offers. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(e) (West Supp. 1994). Section 14(f) adds Section 13(d)
insiders' reports to the regulation. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(f) (West Supp. 1994).
265. Each major subdivision of the Section uses the phrase "it shall be unlawful for any
person to .... " thereby creating the potential for Commission Civil action or Justice Department Criminal action under other sections of the Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u (West
Supp. 1994) (civil proceedings) and 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff (West Supp. 1994) (criminal penalties). For a discussion of issues regarding private causes of action, see J.1.
Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
266. Sections 14(a)-(d) are specifically limited to transactions related to securities regis-
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entitled "Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers in Connection With Limited
Partnership Roll-Up Transactions, '2' and states that "[iut shall be unlawful
for any person to solicit any proxy, consent or authorization concerning a
limited partnership roll-up transaction, or to make any tender offer in furtherance of a limited partnership roll-up transaction, unless such transaction is
conducted in accordance with rules prescribed by the Commission. ' '2 9 This
provision incorporates the express civil investigatory power and SEC causes of
action from section 2127' and the express criminal penalties available to the
Justice Department under section 32.271 The availability of implied private
civil causes of action remains subject to judicial application of the standards
adapted by the Supreme Court in 1975.272
Unlike the previously adopted subsections of section 14, the LPRRA now
specifically identifies substantial and specific mandatory disclosures to be
included in the Commissioner's rules. Thus, the Commission's rulemaking
power in the area of these disclosures will be limited to interpreting the mandates and adding "such other matters deemed necessary or appropriate. ' 273
First, the SEC's rules should mandate the standard for disclosure to be
"clear, concise and comprehensible" in distributed solicitation materials.274
These materials must include: (1)changes in the business plan, voting rights,
form of ownership, or general partner compensation from the original limited
partnerships; (2) any conflicts of interest of the general partner; (3) expectations of any significant differences between disclosed exchange values of the
limited partnership interests and trading prices of the securities to be issued;
(4) valuation of the limited partnerships involved, the method used in that
valuation, and the valuation of the interests to be exchanged in the transaction;
and (5) the differing risks and effects29 of completing the transaction with less
than all of the solicited partnerships.
Subject to the same standard is a required statement by the general partner
as to whether the proposed roll-up is fair to the investors in each limited partnership, including a discussion of the basis for the conclusion. The general
partner's statement is also required to include an evaluation and description of
the alternatives to the roll-up, including liquidation. 76 While it seems unlikely that a general partner would describe the proposed transaction as unfair to
one of the entities to be rolled up, a discussion of the basis for determining
fairness involves some discussion of the relative exchange value computations.

tered under Section 12 of the Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1994).
267. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h) (West Supp. 1994).
268. Id.
269. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h) (West Supp. 1994).
270. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u (West Supp. 1994).
271. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff (West Supp. 1994).
272. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 78 (1975), and its securities law progeny, Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
273. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(1)(D)(vii) (West Supp. 1994).
274. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1994).
275. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(D)(i)-(v) (West Supp. 1994).
276. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(I)(E) (West Supp. 1994).
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Significantly, the description and evaluation of the alternatives to the transaction may prove a mine field of disclosure traps.
• The LPRRA also requires SEC rules regarding disclosure
of outside opinions, appraisals or reports (other than those of counsel) materially related to
the transaction, subject to the same readability standards and required to be
included in solicitation materials."' Due to the significance of the external
evaluations, substantial disclosure is mandated,278 including (I) an analysis of
the transaction, the scope of the review, the preparation of and basis for the
opinion, and representations and undertakings included;2 79 (2) the identity
and qualifications of the preparer, the methods used in the selection process,
and material past, existing or contemplated relationships between that person
and others involved in the transaction;... (3)any compensation contingent on
approval of the transaction;2 1' (4) any limitations imposed on the preparer's
access to personnel, premises or records; 2 2 (5) reasons for limitations on access; 283 (6) if not included, reasons why a valuation opinion is unnecessary
for an informed decision; 2' and (7) an open-ended opportunity for the SEC
to add other protection disclosures to this list.285
These statutory provisions may mean that transactions included under
these regulations will be time consuming and expensive. The extent of deterrence to valuable transactions is difficult to assess at this early stage; however,
the LPRRA requires an evaluation by the Comptroller General within eighteen
months of the statute's operation regarding the usefulness of the disclosure to
286
limited partnership investors.
As mentioned earlier, the statute's implementation of required disclosure
borrows from the 1933 Act.287 The first section of the LPRRA outlaws participation in a roll-up transaction absent compliance with the listed disclosure
rules.288 Thereafter, it broadly defines a limited partnership roll up transaction, as one "involving the combination or reorganization of one or more limited partnerships, directly or indirectly,"2'8 9 provided the transaction also results in the following: (I) issued securities will be traded on a national ex-

277. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(F) (West Supp. 1994).
278. While these external evaluations are of substantial value in aiding the successful
solicitation of approvals, the degree of disclosure required could potentially discourage solicitation of such valuable information. However, non-use requires an explanation of why an
external evaluation is unnecessary. Id.
279. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(F)(i) (West Supp. 1994).
280. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(F)(ii) (West Supp. 1994).
281. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(F)(iii) (West Supp. 1994).
282. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(F)(iv) (West Supp. 1994).
283. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(G) (West Supp. 1994).
284. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(H) (West Supp. 1994).
285. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(K) (West Supp. 1994).
286. See Limited Partnership Rollup Reform Act of 1993, P.L. 103-202, § 302(c), 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 2363-64.
287. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b-e (West Supp. 1994) (discussing definitions, exempted securities, exempted transactions and prohibitions, respectively).
288. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l) (West Supp. 1994).
289. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(4) (West Supp. 1994).
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change or the national market system,29 (2) the interests to be exchanged
have not been traded as of the filing date,29' (3) investors involved are subject to change regarding voting rights, term, management compensation, or
investment objectives,292 and (4) no investors have an option to retain the
security under the same terms and conditions as the original issue.293
Continuing the pattern of the 1933 Act, the new statute follows the broad
definition of a roll-up transaction with a group of specific exemptions entitled
"Exclusions from definition." 2" The exclusions include (1) transactions involving limited partnerships which retain funds for reinvestment, rather than
distribution;2 9 (2) transactions in which the exchange of interests was included in the terms of the original limited partnership and the new operating company was also identified in the original agreement;29 (3) transactions in
which the newly issued securities do not require registration under the Securities Act of 1933;297 (4) transactions involving issuers not required to report
under section 12 of the 1934 Act; 9 (5) transactions resulting in roll-ups
generated by non-affiliated outsiders requiring approval by no less than twothirds of the outstanding units and existing general partners receiving no extraordinary compensation; 29 and (6)transactions in securities under a plan
declared effective before the enactment of the Act. 24X
Based upon these exclusions, Congress was not concerned with small or
private transactions resulting in the issuance of non-publicly traded interests.
Thus, under reorganizations effected to extend the life of a limited partnership
without creating a new market for the interests, investors receive no new protection. There is also no additional protection for investors involved in reorganizations of infinite life partnerships or investors in limited partnerships in
which the takeover (reorganization) transaction was effected by an outside interest. Apparently, new protections are only available in cases of roll-ups of
limited partnerships generated by general partners (or sponsors affiliated with
general partners), who choose not only to extend the life of the limited partnership but also to create a trading market for the resulting interests.
Certain realities, however, support the definitional exclusions in the
LPRRA. First, it would be difficult to gain approval of roll-ups without creating a market for resale of the new interests. If market creation is an incentive
to encourage the roll-up transaction, substantial disclosure is required.3"'

290. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1994).
291. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1994).
292. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1994).
293. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(4)(D) (West Supp. 1994).
294. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5) (West Supp. 1994).
295. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1994).
296. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1994).
297. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5)(C) (West Supp. 1994).
298. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5)(D) (West Supp. 1994).
299. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5)(E) (West Supp. 1994).
300. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5)(F) (West Supp. 1994).
301. Unfortunately, since no market exists to reflect the values identified by the mandated disclosures until after the transaction, investors can benefit only if the decision to
approve is based on an understanding of the disclosure documents, rather than the opportuni-
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Second, locked-in investors have little to lose, and disclosure protects new
investors from paying an excessive price for the new interests via the market's
reaction to the mandated disclosure in pricing the new securities. This latter
cynical (but realistic) assumption indicates the old disclosure scheme's failure
to protect against those injuries most clearly identified in the congressional
hearings.
The final piece of the disclosure scheme enacted in the new legislation
responds to the latter observation;3;2 it provides for special SEC rulemaking
to assure that holders of interests in proposed roll-up transactions can engage
in preliminary communications with fellow interest holders without the rigors
of section 14(a) proxy restrictions. 3 Under this provision, the SEC must
promulgate rules requiring issuers to provide such investors with lists of other
investors who will be involved in the transaction's approval. 3" Finally, recognizing the complexity of the disclosed information, the LPRRA requires a
minimum solicitation period of sixty days.0 5
In addition to basic disclosure rules, the LPRRA also attempts to provide
some indirect protections. First, in an attempt to remedy abuses identified in
the congressional hearings regarding compensation of proxy solicitors, the Act
goes beyond the NASD rules" and prohibits "compensating any person soliciting proxies, consents or authorizations ... contingent on the approval,
disapproval or completion of the limited partnership roll-up transaction. ' '
As a second indirect protection, the LPRRA extends the rules governing
the registered securities associations' rules of fair practice. 8 by imposing
limits on its members' participation in roll-up transactions."
These
members' participation is conditioned on the transaction bearing certain characteristics, including dissenters' rights, protection of voting rights, fair transactional cost distribution, and restrictions on general partners' contingent interests. 3 The mandatory alternative dissenters' rights include: (1) appraisal and
compensations; (2) a new security offering substantially the same terms as the
old security; (3) approval by no less than 75% of the outstanding interests of
each limited partnership; (4) use of an "independent committee" approved by a
majority of the interests of each participating partnership with authority to
action behalf of the limited partners; or (5) comparable rights prescribed by
the registered association designed to protect dissenters.3 ' Only if dissenters

ty to "bail out" in a subsequent sale. This assumption is speculative at best.
302. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(I)(A)-(B), (J) (West Supp. 1994).
303. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1994). This section also places limitations
on the availability of such assurances and limitations on potential abuses. 15 U.S.C.A. §
78n(h)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 1994).
304. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1994).
305. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(1)(J) (West Supp. 1994).
306. 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 189 (Feb. 5, 1993).
307. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(C) (West Supp. 1994).
308. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3 (West Supp. 1994).
309. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(12) (West Supp. 1994).
310. See U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b)(12)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 1994).
311.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b)(12(A)(i)-(iv) (West Supp. 1994).
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are permitted one of these five options may members of registered associations
participate in the roll-up transaction.
A third type of indirect protection results from amendments to the statutory requirements for listing on national securities exchanges" and statutory
standards for admission to the automated quotation system. 3 The listing and
quotation standards mandated by the LPRRA are those dissenters' rights required for participation of members of registered associations.
It i s, o f
course, difficult to predict the effect of a statutory amendment on the heels of
its adoption; however, some matters are readily apparent. The amendment will
only impact roll-ups designed to result in the public trading of interests formerly privately held. Such transactions will be subjected to the time and expense involved in tailoring them to the new statutory mandates. The disjunctive nature of the requirements, however, will allow lawyers to design transactions which comply with only one alternative while providing substantial likelihood of approval by interest holders. Nonetheless, the combination of disclosure, dissenters' rights alternatives, and veto power created by delay and interinvestor communications, will add expense to already costly transactions.
Public investors purchasing new interests from old investors in the preexisting
partnerships may still purchase them at greatly discounted prices. As a result,
old investors will face a Hobson's choice: denying the transaction and receiving substantially discounted liquidation values, approving the transaction and
acquiring greatly discounted prices for their interest, or holding a new form of
their old investment, which has the potential of a market but which also was
created at substantial expense. It is not clear that the new statutory amendments offer old investors anything more than a clearer view of a larger loss.
CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to provide an overview of the debacle suffered
by investors in some limited partnership roll-ups. This overview is dependent
upon a background understanding of the various alternative transactions which
can result in the roll-up. Additionally, awareness of the changes in the state
statutes which regulate the limited partnership and how they facilitate or frustrate these alternative transactions is essential.
The substantial losses suffered by limited partnerships, and consequently
by investors, resulted from the confluence of several legal and economic variables. As limited partnerships became highly desirable business organization
forms, the modernization of governing state statutes unintentionally laid the
groundwork for unanticipated subsequent reorganizations. The elimination of
prior tax advantages also contributed to unexpected diminutions in value of
these investments, which were often difficult to quantify. Almost simultaneously, economic conditions negatively impacted the value of the assets underlying these entities' investments, and the lack of a market for the individual
investors' interests masked such losses.

312.
313.

15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(b) (West Supp. 1994).
15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b)(13) (West Supp. 1994).
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The sponsors and general partners of these entities were the first, and
perhaps most informed, witnesses to these changes. For a variety of reasons,
including the pressures of required imminent asset liquidation and reduced
liquidation distributions to investors, these managers sought means to postpone
forced losses and to diversify their investors' risks. Roll-up reorganizations of
these limited partnerships offered that opportunity. Press recognition of
investors' losses from tax changes and economic impacts, as well from excesses in the reorganization transactions themselves, created a demand for new
protections from these transactions.
The economic conditions leading to the use of roll-ups, as well as abuses
in roll-up transactions, have generated investor-protective reactions from several sources. State legislatures have not been particularly instrumental in developing protective devices. The self-regulatory organizations in the securities
industry have developed limited rules to regulate the most abusive conduct of
their members. None of these initiatives, however, have had major impact, and
large portions of the roll-up problem seem outside the control of these organizations.
The SEC has clarified and expanded its regulation of these transactions.
Its protective scheme revolves around increased disclosure requirements. Opinions differ regarding the effectiveness of disclosure as a direct investor protective device which protects by increasing investor awareness of risk; nonetheless, heightened disclosure may indirectly dilute roll-up sponsors' excesses.
Indirect disincentives created by more extensive mandated disclosures include
increased costs and increased delays in needed transactions.
Indicating either its lack of confidence in the effect of the SEC's expanded rulemaking or its political need to respond to the roll-up debacle, Congress
has amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to add to the investor-protective arsenal with the Limited Partnership Roll-up Reform Act of 1993
("LPRRA"). These changes, added to the SEC's earlier disclosure mandates,
have intensified the regulations' financial impact on roll-up transactions. The
investors whom the LPPRA seeks to protect may, however, ultimately bear the
costs of the new statutory regime.
Ultimately, if public systems of prevention prove inadequate, private litigation offers perhaps the final hope for investor protection. Because roll-up
transactions represent a relatively new phenomena, the litigation they have
generated has not yet developed into a consistent body of substantial analysis
tested by appellate scrutiny. Common law claims for breach of fiduciary duty
represent one potential approach to future litigation. Undoubtedly, the LPRRA
will generate additional theories of litigation, but the federal courts' willingness to imply those causes of action must first be developed.
The multiple sources of recently-developed protective devices will mean
substantially greater lawyer involvement in planning roll-up transactions,
which should become even more complex in the wake of the LPRRA. Increased complexity implies increased cost. If these developments become
prohibitively expensive, our economy will see the loss of a valuable investment vehicle. This article provides a framework for evaluating these various
effects. As litigation and rulemaking develops under the LPRRA, it is hoped

444

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

that subsequent analysis will be forthcoming.
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